Does the Taylor rule prescribe negative interest rates for 2009-2011? This question is important because negative prescribed interest rates provide a justification for quantitative easing once actual policy rates hit the zero lower bound. We answer the question by analyzing Fed policy following the recessions of the early-to-mid 1970s, the early 1990s, and the early 2000s in the context of both Taylor's original rule and latter variants of Taylor rules. While Taylor's original rule, which can be justified by historical experience during and following the recessions, does not produce negative prescribed interest rates for 2009-2011, variants of Taylor rules with larger output gap coefficients, which do produce negative interest rates, cannot be justified by the same historical experience. We conclude that the Taylor rule does not provide a rationale for quantitative easing.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, Taylor (1993) rule at all times, they provide an extremely useful benchmark for monetary policy evaluation. 1 The original Taylor rule states that the Fed set its policy rate (the federal funds rate) at one plus 1.5 times the inflation rate plus 0.5 times the output gap, the percentage deviation of GDP from potential GDP. In Taylor (1993) , this simple rule is primarily prescriptive, based on simulations of a range of estimated monetary models, although it is also descriptive, as a close approximation of Fed policy between 1987 and 1992.In Taylor (1999) , the rule is explicitly normative, with large deviations from baseline rules identified as policy mistakes.
At the height of the financial crisis in December 2008, the Fed lowered its target for the federal funds rate to between 0 and 0.25 percent, and it anticipates holding it at this level until at least 2015.
While this ended (at least temporarily) the use of Taylor rules for positive analysis, the use of Taylor There has been a lively debate on this topic. The debate started with an article by Guha (2009) , which cited a confidential Fed staff study that placed the implied Taylor rule rate at negative 5 percent. 1 Kydland and Prescott (1977) provide the seminal justification for rules-based monetary policy. 2 A rationale for QE1 was to provide liquidity to financial markets. Analysis of this rationale outside of the context of the Taylor rule is beyond the scope of this paper. Taylor (2009a) countered that the Fed got both the sign and the decimal point wrong and calculated the rate at 0.5 percent. Rudebusch (2009) , in an article that (despite the usual disclaimer) was widely interpreted as reflecting the internal Fed position, argued for negative 5 percentand Meyer (2009) advocated close to negative 6 percent. Conversely, Taylor(2009b) countered that the rate should be zero. Rudebusch (2010) argued that the implied Taylor rule was between negative 5 and 6 percent while Taylor (2010a) , depending on the size of the output gap, argued for between 0.75 and negative 0.75 percent, close to current Fed policy and far from negative 6 percent. Taylor (2011a) argued that QE1 and QE2 are examples of harmful deviations from rules-based economic policies. Bernankeclaimed that Taylor picked a different rule in 1999 than in 1993, one that would be consistent with negative interest rates, while Taylor countered that he did not propose or prefer an alternative rule in his 1999 paper. 3 What accounts for these very large differences? By far the most important factor is the coefficient on the output gap. Both Meyer and Rudebusch(explicitly) and Bernanke (implicitly) use coefficients that are double Taylor's coefficient. With an output gap of minus 6.6 percent, as calculated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for 2009, this alone would decrease the implied interest rate by 3.3 percent. 4 In addition, Meyer and Rudebusch use the unemployment gap, the difference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate of unemployment, instead of the output gap. With very low inflation, differences in the inflation coefficients were unimportant although, with forecasts of higher or lower inflation, the use of forecasted, rather than realized, inflation would either raise or lower the negative implied federal funds rate, a higher output gap coefficient and forecasted rather than realized inflation, it would have contributed even more to the Great Inflation and Great Deviation while running overly stimulative policy in the 1990s. It is difficult to see why "improvements" to Taylor's rule which would have produced worse historical outcomes should be expected to produce better outcomes in the 2010s, and so we fail to find any justification for changing the rule.
Taylor's Rule and its Modifications
Following Taylor (1993) , the monetary policy rule postulated to be followed by central banks can be specified as forecasts should be used instead of realized values. The second is to conduct the analysis using an output gap coefficient of 1.0 instead of 0.5. The rationale for this adjustment is usually based on estimates of past Fed behavior, but sometimes it is also claimed that a larger coefficient is optimal in the context of DSGE models. Incorporating both modifications produces the following equation, If the equilibrium real interest rate is lower, this will decrease the postulated Taylor rule interest rate.
Taylor Rules with Real-Time Data
Following Orphanides (2001) , it has become standard practice to use real-time data that was available to policymakers at the time that interest rate setting decisions were made for both positive and 
Taylor's Rule versus Taylor Rules following Five Recessions
Monetary policy following the end of recessions is a crucial determinant of subsequent economic performance. Even though the recession has officially ended, unemployment usually remains high and the output gap is negative. The Fed typically faces a series of decisions as it tries to avoid over-stimulating the economy and causing subsequent inflation or under-stimulating the economy and prolonging the slowdown.The Taylor rule provides a benchmark for this situation, as the rule stipulates that the Fed should raise interest rates as the output gap closes and/or inflation rises.
Taylor Rules following the 1970s Recessions
There Monetary policy during and following the 1970s recessions is widely regarded as being too stimulative. This is illustrated in Figure 1 , which plots the actual interest rate and the interest rate implied by the original Taylor rule in Equation ( 
Taylor Rules following the 1990-1991 Recession
Monetary policy following the recession of 1990-91 is generally regarded as successful. The target level for the Federal Funds rate, which was 8 ¼ percent in the first half of 1990, was gradually 9 The results for two-to-four quarter-ahead inflation forecasts, when available, are very similar.
lowered, starting in July 1990, to 3 percent in September 1992 in response to the recession. It was left unchanged until February 1994 when, based on the possibility of incipient inflation, it was gradually raised to 6 percent by February 1995. Inflation, which fell from over 6 percent in late 1990 to 3 percent in late 1991, stayed around 3 percent until 1997.
In contrast to the 1970s, monetary policy following the recession of 1990-91 is not regarded as being too stimulative. This is illustrated in Figure 3 , which plots the actual interest rate and the interest rate implied by the original Taylor rule in Equation (3) 
Taylor Rules following the 2001 Recession
Monetary policy following the 2001 recession has been a subject of much controversy. Poole Taylor (2007) argued that this deviation from rules-based policy caused the housing price bubble and, in subsequent papers and speeches, including Taylor (2010b Taylor ( , 2011a , that the deviation 11 In addition to the different spans, Rudebusch uses revised data with inflation measured by the core PCE deflator and we use real-time data with inflation measured by the GDP deflator.
was on the order of magnitude of the deviations in the 1970s and was the root cause of the financial crisis and the Great Recession. The deviation is illustrated in Figure 5 , which depicts the interest rate prescribed by Taylor's rule with showed that the gap between the actual and prescribed interest rates narrowed considerably. 13 The difference between Bernanke's and Taylor's results dependsmore on the use of PCE instead of CPI inflation than on the use of forecasted instead of realized inflation. Figure 6 is identical to Figure 5 except that realized CPI inflation is replaced by forecasted one-year-ahead CPI inflation, with the forecasts from the SPF. The results are very similar to those in Figure 5 . With an output gap coefficient of 0.5, the federal funds rate is below the prescribed Taylor A problem with the use of core PCE and headline CPI inflation is that real-time data is not available for policy analysis following the 1970s and 1990s recessions. 15 In order to compare Fed policy following the 2001 recession to its policies following the earlier recessions, Figure 9 depicts the interest rate prescribed by Taylor 
4.4Taylor Rules following the 2007 -2009Recession
As the financial crisis and the Great Recession unfolded, the Fed steadily lowered its target for the federal funds rate from 5. Bernanke (2010) emphasized, the oil price shock produced unreasonably high prescribed policy rates, the pattern is similar across specifications. For core PCE inflation, core PCE inflation forecasts, GDP deflator inflation, and GDP deflator inflation forecasts in Figures7-10, the prescribed and actual policy rates fell in tandem, with the rules with an output gap coefficient of 1.0 tracking the actual rate better than the rules with an output gap coefficient of 0.5.
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The focus of the current debate has been the prescribed Taylor 
Conclusions
In an address before the joint luncheon session of the American Economics Association and the American Finance Association in January, 2011, John Taylor delineated the major trends in the balance between rules and discretion over the past 60 years -toward more discretionary policies in the 1960s and 1970s, toward more rules-based policies in the 1980s and 1990s, and again toward more discretionary 17 Taylor (2010a, 2011b) gets slightly positive prescribed federal funds rates by using the average output gap in Weidner and Williams (2011) instead of the CBO gap. Rudebusch (2009 Rudebusch ( , 2010 gets more negative prescribed rates by using the unemployment gap instead of the output gap. 18 Neely (2012) estimated that QE1 was equivalent to a 5% decrease in the federal funds rate. If QE2 maintained the effect on long rates that QE1 established, this would be consistent with a Taylor rule with an output gap coefficient of 1.0, but not with Taylor's original rule.
policies in the 2000s -and presented historical evidence that rules-based monetary and fiscal policies are beneficial to the economy.
While it would seem tautological to say that the Taylor rule is an example of a rules-based policy, this is not necessarily the case. With Taylor's original rule, that the federal funds rate equal one plus 1.5 times the inflation rate plus 0.5 times the output gap, you can evaluate policy in terms of adherence to and deviations from a well-specified rule. Once you start changing the rule, as in variants of Taylor 
